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I. INTRODUCTION
Man's exploration of space is often analogized to his exploration of
the ancient oceans. Ancient sea-explorers faced obstacles of uncharted
oceans and land. They also faced difficulties in finding the means and
financing to make their discoveries. Space industrial development suffers
difficulties as well, however, many of the difficulties are legal obstacles.
This author' and numerous legal authorities2 have asserted that international
space law presently hinders the commercial development of outer space,
and thus, requires legal change. Vigorous space commercial development
is crucial, however, not for intellectual development alone.3 It offers
massive economic,4  medical,, industrial,6  and humanitarian rewards.7
1. Ty S. Twibell, Note: Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and
Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REV. 590.
2. See Glenn H. Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First Century, 25
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 233 (1992). ("The United States should play a major part by
proposing amendments to the Treaty that recognize the important role played by private property
rights in promoting development of outer space."); Kurt A. Baca, Property Rights in Outer
Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 1041, 1046 (1993) ("The successful development of space
resources requires meaningful property rights, allocation of those rights and recourse to some
power for the enforcement of those rights."); Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible:
A Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 345, 347-48 (1995) (asserting that space industrial development is inhibited by the
current body of international space law).
3. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 1.
4. "Mhe current space industry today is a multi-billion dollar industry with revenues of
$40 billion annually." Id. at 31. "Although these figures sound impressive, they are a result of
small-scale, isolated space ventures which merely scratch the surface of what can be achieved
given changes in the current legal regime." Id. at 32.
5. Advancements in the medical field have resulted from efforts in space endeavors such
as artificial skin, "accelerated development of hospital monitoring devices and similar paramedic
tools, heart pacemakers, and artificial skin. . . . In space biotechnology, purer biological
preparations have been obtained for manufacturing non-allergenic medicines, more active and
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Better vaccines and antibiotics can be produced in space in far greater
quantities than on earth.8 Mining the moons,9 asteroids, 0 and comets"
provides answers to future energy depletion and would provide enormously
less expensive construction of spacecraft and colonies than launching from
Earth. 2 Space industry also paves the way in addressing future crises both
manmade3 and natural."4
stable strains of antibiotics, vitamins for use in agriculture, and ultrapure serums and vaccines."
Id. at 39.
6. The electronics industry would benefit from space industry and some of these benefits
are already being realized on a small scale much for the same reasons as developments in
vaccines and antibiotics, see supra note 5, because of the vacuum and weightlessness of space
unmatched by any attempt to replicate a similar vacuum on earth. Ceramic oxide crystals grown
in space have lead to developments in "computer memories, optical communications,
optoelectronics, and ultrasonics . . . . " Id. at 42.
Another compound, gallium arsenide, used for switching on computers, is estimated to
have a worldwide market of $860 million by the year 2000. One company has
contracted with NASA to produce gallium arsenide aboard the space shuttle and
estimates $400 million could be realized with only ten percent of the market.
Id.
7. Humanitarian rewards would result from the societal benefit from the improvements
and products space industry has to offer. Space industry would also provide a strong foothold in
space able to solve near-future crises. See infra note 13.
8. "The [space] environment enables, as demonstrated by experiments on the space
shuttle, improved production over earth bound laboratories at seven hundred times the quantity
and four times the purity." Twibell, supra note 1, at 38 (citing NATHAN C. GOLDMAN,
AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 25 (1996)).
9. The Moon has numerous resources available such as iron, aluminum, copper, and
Helium3. Id. at 44. Helium3, once nuclear fusion becomes controlled, exists on the Moon in
massive quantities and barely exists on Earth because of the solar wind and Earth's atmosphere.
Helium3 would enable fusion to have virtually no dangerous radiation unlike the current use of
fission.
10. A "one-kilometer-sized metallic asteroid will provide a billion tons of iron, 200
million tons of nickel, 10 million tons of cobalt, and 20,000 tons of platinum metals: net market
value, about $1 trillion." JOHN S. LEWIS & RUTH A. LEWIS, SPACE RESOURCES: BREAKING
THE BONDS OF EARTH 105, 394 (1989).
11. Hydrocarbons, similar to peterochemicals and fossil fuels, exist in massive quantities
throughout the solar system. For example, "Halley's Comet hydrocarbon stores are comparable
to Earth's entire reserves." Twibell, supra note 1, at 47 (citing A. Zuppero, Discovery of
Abundant, Accessible Hydrocarbons Nearly Everywhere in the Solar System, in STEWART W.
JOHNSON, 2 ENGINEERING, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATIONS IN: SPACE V 791 (1996).
Moreover, comets come closer to Earth than other celestial bodies and can be reached using
current rocket technology. See id. at n.330.
12. Launching payloads into space is very burdensome and cumbers construction of large
spacecraft. Mining celestial bodies is the key.
Mining extra-terrestrial bodies, such as asteroids and the moon, is crucial
for a substantive space industrialization, not for the immediate purpose of
exportation back to Earth to supplement our resources - that is a need not
to come for many decades or centuries - but for colonization and the
construction of large projects in space. Such mining is the only feasible way
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This paper seeks methods to overcome legal hurdles that inhibit
mankind's motivation to develop a vigorous space industry. It also seeks
to address concerns for endeavors that will ultimately challenge the current
weaknesses in space law including colonization, space stations, and new
to construct any space station, space ship, or other similar facility of any
significant size. It is to inefficient and expensive to launch large amounts of
raw materials into space. For example, it takes 100 tons of rocket
propellant to get one ton of payload into geostationary orbit. Whereas, a
mass driver - a sort of magnetic catapult already technologically feasible -
on the moon or an asteroid could hurl mined materials into orbit for
construction, lifting 100 times its own weight into orbit every year. This
would lower the cost of building space facilities near earth by an amazing
20,000 times.
Id. at 45.
13. Established colonies in space would obviously create an escape route for world-wide
man-made catastrophes such as nuclear holocaust. Space development would also pave the way
for the development of new technologies that could address needs here on earth. Overpopulation
is one inevitable problem. Nobel Laureate, Richard Smalley notes the population explosion as
one reason to invest in nanotechnology research. The human population explosion is unique
from any time in history. Smalley states that the human population has never decreased since
year 1 A.D. It has remained constant on a global level and has exponentially increased over the
past two centuries. Major wars and plagues that have been often cited as important in keeping
the human population at a controllable level and that a major third world war or viral epidemic as
inevitable in controlling the human population and that neither has existed for sometime.
However, that assertion is a myth. Neither wars nor the Black Death (which killed a third of
Europe) affected total world population levels. The total world population was approximately
one billion until the 1800s. It slightly rose until the beginning of the twentieth century to almost
two billion. The industrial revolution and advances in education were one of the main causes.
After World War II the population was almost 3.5 billion. Today it is over six billion. The
U.N. projects total world population levels by the middle of the next century to be approximately
twelve to sixteen billion before leveling off. Smalley goes on to state that "keep in mind, four
billion of today's six billion live a lifestyle that many of us in this room would find abhorrent."
That fact, relatively speaking, probably will not change. The concerns of feeding fifteen billion
are not such a problem, but energy consumption and carbon dioxide pollution resulting. See
Richard Smalley lecture, University of Missouri-Kansas City, March 26, 1997. Space industrial
development will be a necessary venture to help man's population problem.
14. Natural occurences, although perhaps far away and perceptively academic still merit
attention.
[T]he survival of mankind could ultimately depend on a well-developed foothold in
space and commercial development. One day the Earth will die. It could be
tomorrow or in a few billion years. Assuming the later occurs, the middle-aged sun
will swell up into a red giant and swallow the Earth before it contracts into a white-
dwarf or black hole. [But] there will also be environmental catastrophes beyond our
control. For example, there are about 2,000 asteroids or other similar objects that will
cross Earth's orbit, measuring at least one kilometer in size that threaten use with
collision and mass global destruction and at least a documented 400 of these will
certainly collide with Earth.
Twibell, supra note 1, at 31.
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technologies such as nanotechnology and replicating technology.', This
hurdle is treaty-made, therefore, international legal analysis is required to
jump over the hurdle. Dias, Gama, Columbus, Magellan, and Drake
sought the safest or the shortest passages to a desired destination.' 6
Similarly, this paper will first focus on the safest or the shortest passage in
jumping the legal hurdle of international corpus juris spatialis" before
proceeding to the longest and most difficult passage - circumnavigating
the entire globe. In this instance, circumnavigating the entire globe is
equivalent to the act of amending the treaty.
First, before exploring the best route of legal analysis, some
groundwork will need to be laid. This paper provides a brief overview of
the present body of international space law and will identify the
problematic portion of that body of law. Then, the basic principles of
international space laws primary source will be recognized while outlining
the full extent of the problem. Finally, this article will present and analyze
a series of vaccines (accepted methods for change in international treaty
law) to determine which vaccine is best for ridding international space law
of its virus.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL CORPUS JURIS SPATIALIS
The international corpus juris spatialis is a relatively new
emerging area of law beginning roughly in 1957.18 Soon thereafter, an
15. In 1982 NASA proposed an automated self-replicating lunar facility. NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR ENGINEERING
EDUCATION, ADVANCED AUTOMATION FOR SPACE MISSIONS 189, NASA Conference
Publication 2255 (1982). If implemented, a self-replicating system would have profound effects
on law and society including displacing the entire global economy with cheap and accessible
goods and creating liability and property issues from an artificially intelligent machine that
converts res communis property into itself possible indefinitely. See infra text accompanying
notes 79-81 (discussing the res communis nature of outer space). Nanotechnology is a fairly new
field that deals with creating and manipulating substances and creating "machines on an atomic
or molecular scale." There is "wet" and "dry" nanotechnology. Living things are of the "wet
type." Living cells are "sacks filled with nanomachines." The dry kind, the kind most referred
to when using the term nanotechnology, seeks to create a similar biological process utilizing
molecular manipulation and artificial intelligence. Ralph Merkle, currently working for Xerox in
formulating molecular modeling for nanotechnology, has stated that molecular manufacturing
(basically nanotechnology) will replace the existing industrial infrastructure. For an article solely
addressing the legal implications of nanotechnology, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593 (1994).
16. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 286 (1983).
17. Derived from the Latin meaning body of space law.
18. Most commentators mark 1957 - the year the U.S.S.R. launched the first satellite,
Sputnik - as the year space law began to develop. See, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 8.
"Until then, the legal status of activities in space was a speculative matter rather than an
immediate practical problem." Twibell, supra note 1, at 9 citing C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE
LAW 3 (1965)).
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immediate series of United Nations resolutions 9 and international treaties 2
swiftly emerged leading to the development of the 1967 Space Treaty. 2'
Even today, almost thirty years later, this is the primary space treaty which
is often referred to as "the cornerstone of international space law. "2
Three other treaties emerged soon after the 1967 Space Treaty's
passage, the last coming into being in 1975, which formed the main corpus
juris spatialis that exists today. 23 These three new treaties addressed more
19. BRUCE A. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 2, 18 (1986)
(referring to U.N. Resolutions 1721 A (XVI), 1962 (XVIII) and 1184 (XVIII) as some of the
resolutions leading up to the formation of the 1967 Space Treaty). The "1967 Space Treaty"
refers to infra, note 21.
20. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and
Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313.
21. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410
[hereinafter 1967 Space Treaty].
22. See Keefe, supra note 2, at 349. See also Twibell, supra note 1, at (9 citing
GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at 69). See also Barbara Ellen Heim, Note Exploring the Last
Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 832 (1990). Some
commentators even refer to the 1967 Space Treaty as the Mother Treaty of space law. See
Michael M. Bernard, Transformation of Property Rights in the Space Age, 7 AIR & SPACE L. 6,
11(1993).
23. See The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Objects
Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter 1968 Rescue and Return
of Astronauts Agreement]; The Convention of International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter 1972 Convention on International
Liability]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter the 1975 Registration Convention]. Many commentators assert that the
main body is actually composed of five treaties. See, e.g., HURWITZ, supra note 19, at 2. They
include the 1979 Moon Treaty, United Nations: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies opened for signature on Dec. 18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434, as
"one of the five stars in the constellation of space law." David Everett Marko, A Kinder Gentler
Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8 J.
NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 293 (1993). However, this is a more popular notion of those
sympathetic to developing countries. Twibell, supra note 1, at 10 referring to HURWITZ, supra
note 19 (Israeli commentator), and CHARLES C. OKOLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SATELLITE
REMOTE SENSING & OUTER SPACE 42-50 (1989) (African sympathetic). The 1979 Moon Treaty
has not been included in this commentary because to date, "it has been ratified by only seven
states, whereas, the 1967 'Space Treaty' has been ratified by ninety-eight states." Twibell, supra
note 1, at 12 (citing Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58 J. AIR L. & COM.
1041, 1069 (1993) (stating that the 1979 Moon Treaty is not binding as a treaty and "the claim
that it represents customary law is probably not credible")); and Eric Husby, Comment,
Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 359, 361 (1994) (stating
that only seven nations have signed the 1979 Moon Treaty). Moreover, the signing of this
Treaty is not advocated because it would further negatively inhibit space investment.
If the space powers begin to sign the Moon Treaty, commercial investment will be
significantly inhibited more than it is under existing space law. Any present ambiguity
allowing some degree of property rights in space would be removed and those rights
along with it. Further, under the existing law, it is possible to interpret the proposition
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specific concerns than those of the 1967 Space Treaty. 24  For example, it
addressed liability for damage caused by space objects5 and the procedures
and protections afforded astronauts should they land or crash on foreign
soil.2 Accordingly, as time went on until now, both multilatera27 and
bilateral treatiesu were formed to meet the pressing needs of space
exploration 29  and a growing multi-billion-dollar industry,30
that non-state entities may be allowed to appropriate space property to themselves.
Intellectual property rights are also possible under existing law. However, the Moon
Treaty prevents ownership even [by non-state entities]. Intellectual property rights
would also be threatened and such innovations would be the property of all mankind,
and not of any particular person or nation. [I]f stripped of any exclusivity or their
outer space discoveries, companies are unlikely to invest resources in making such
discoveries.
Twibell, supra note 1. For a fuller understanding of property rights discussion as part of the
premise for seeking the change this paper advocates, see infra, text accompanying notes 29-44.
24. See infra, 1967 Space Treaty Discussion, text accompanying notes 38-44.
25. See, e.g., 1972 Convention on International Liability, supra note 23, art. V.
("Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they shall be jointly and severally
liable or any damage caused.").
26. See, e.g., 1968 Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement, supra note 23, art. IV
("If, owing to accident, distress, emergency, or unintended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft
land in territory under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely and promptly returned to
representatives of the launching authority.").
27. See Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization [hereinafter
INMARSAT], July 16, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 1. This treaty seeks to benefit all "ships of all nations
through the most advanced suitable space technology available, for the most efficient and
economic facilities possible consistent with the most efficient and equitable use of the radio
frequency spectrum and of satellite orbits." Id. preamble. It also seeks to "make provision for
the space segment necessary for improving maritime communications, thereby assisting in
improving distress and safety. . . ." Id. art. 3(1). See also Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, Jan. 17, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 333 art. I, II
(regulating "environmental modification techniques" - the deliberate manipulation of . . .
natural process[es] - in outer space).
28. See, e.g., Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America,
Governments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the
Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and
Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, Sept. 29, 1988, 1992 WL 466295,
Article VII, available in USTREATIES database (entered into force Jan. 30, 1992)
(implementing aspects of criminal jurisdiction)[hereinafter European, Japanese, and Canadian
Space Station Agreement]; Agreement Between the United States and Italy for the Design,
Development, Operation and Utilitization of Two Mini Pressurized Logistics Modules and a Mini
Laboratory for Space Station Freedom, with Memorandum of Understanding, art. II, IV,
available in 1992 WL 466066 (entered into force June 1, 1992) (mandating that each nation will
retain jurisdiction over its nationals in its component of the space station)[hereinafter U.S./Italy
Space Station Agreement].
29. Although the 1979 Moon Treaty is not a main component of international space law
because it has been signed by so few countries, it serves as a good example of foreseen new
demands on the legal system caused by future space exploration. See 1979 Moon Treaty, supra
note 23. For example, the Treaty foresaw the eventual exploitation of the resources of the Moon
and other celestial bodies. See id. preamble.
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telecommunications' and the commercial launch industry 2 are two
examples. As a result, an immense body of international law has
developed in a span barely over thirty years. Its fast growth represents the
pace of modern society and the growth of communications and new
technology. This growth is unparalleled in authoritative doctrines and
institutional practices." This explosive growth is not limited to the
international realm; United States domestic law has also experienced an
equally explosive growth in its own corpus juris spatialis,3 and similarly,
the domestic law of other nations has experienced much growth.3
30. The current space industry is estimated to have revenues totaling upwards to $40
billion dollars annually. Twibell, supra note 1, at 30; see also, supra text accompanying notes
4-8.
31. See International Telecommunication Convention, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2497; see
also Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (hereinafter INTELSAT), Aug. 20, 1971, 23. U.S'T. 4091.
32. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China Regarding International Trade
in Commercial Launch Services, Mar. 16, 1989, U.S.-China, 28 I.L.M. 596.
33. Stephen Gorove, The Growth of Space Law Through the Cases, 24 J. SPACE L. 1
(1996).
34. Agency development, statutory law, and case law has flourished in the United States.
Major government agencies regulate outer space: The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (most famous regulator of space activity and forerunner of the United States space
industry), the Department of Defense (this department's space budget almost exceeds NASA's
entire budget), the Department of Transportation (regulates and licenses launching vehicles), and
the Department of Commerce (promotes the commercialization of space via its Office of Air and
Space Commercialization). See generally Twibell, supra note 1, at 2, 17. There has been an
appreciable amount of growth in the statutory realm as well. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A § 105 (West
1997) (regulating the patentability of inventions in outer space); 15 U.S.C.A. § 4201 (West
1997) (regulating land remote-sensing commercialization); 17 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West 1997)
(regulating the protection of semiconductor chips --such chips are produced efficiently in the
vacuum of outer space); The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-575,
(1984) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. § 70101 et. seq. (1984)); and the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426 (1958) (codified as' amended in 42
U.S.C. § 2451 (1994) (forming NASA and instituting its directives and policies). See also
National Space Port Act Bill, 141 CONG. REC. H4915 (May 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Seastrand) ("a bill to encourage the development of the commercial space industry by promoting
State-run spaceports"); and The Space Business Incentives Act of 1995 (H.R. 1953) introduced
on June 28, 1995 (encouraging United States commercial space industry) as cited in
Congressional Notes, 23 J. SPACE L. 204 (1995). The ever slow developing United States space
case law is developing at a modest pace. Professor Stephen Gorove notes that United States
space case law began in 1946. See Gorove, supra note 33, at 3 (citing States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (hinting that the ancient doctrine cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelwn (he
who owns the land, owns it to the skies) may apply to outer space)). Since 1946, United States
space case law has developed in the areas of torts and contracts, environment (e.g., Fla.
Coalition for Peace and Justice v. George Herbert Walker Bush, Civil Action No. 89-2682-OG)
(D.D.C. 1989) (involving the Galileo spacecraft and environmentalists claiming it used
dangerously large amounts of plutonium), taxation (e.g. COMSAT v. Franchise Tax Board, 156
Cal. App. 3d 726 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1984) (holding that "satellites were 'tangible personal
property owned and used' in the state by the taxpayer"), intellectual property (e.g. Hughes
Twibell
Unfortunately, as stated in the forefront of this paper, despite the
immense growth and adaptation of space law to space activities, space law
lacks certainty and proper incentives, and, as a result, fails to effectively
promote aggressive space enterprise. Further, international law's failure in
these two respects will render it thoroughly incapable of regulating new
technologies that could take the world by storm?6
This brings the discussion of "International Corpus Juris Spatialis"
to its main issue - which part (or parts) of this immense body of space
law is the culprit? Fortunately, the culprit is one simple basic section -
the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty clause.17  This provision,
analogous to a computer virus, has spread throughout international law and
permeated every other subsequent agreement including United States
domestic law. How, and to what degree, this virus has spread is where
this paper now turns.
III. THE OVERARCHING EFFECT OF THE 1967 SPACE TREATY'S No-
SOVEREIGNTY PROVISION: IDENTIFYING THE DEGREE OF INFECTION
A computer virus spreads by replicating itself in other computer
programs until the programs are smothered by the overwhelming memory
storage requirements of the replicating virus. The no-sovereignty virus,
however, has only to replicate itself once to do its damage. And instead of
attacking computer programs, it attacks international legal documents.
Before discussing how to get rid of this virus, it is necessary to evaluate
what programs it has infected. But first, the virus itself will be discussed.
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993) (holding that certain statutory claims did
not extend to outer space), id. at 5, 12, 15-16, and constitutional law (e.g., O'Hair v. Paine, 312
F.Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1969) holding that religious activities, statements, and objects that
occurred or were placed aboard NASA's Apollo spacecraft did not constitute violations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). See Twibell, supra note 1, at 16.
35. Much of this development in foreign domestic law is attributed to the regulation of
growth in various country's space industrial infrastructure. Russia, China, the Ukraine, India,
Israel, Japan, Australia, Pakistan, and Brazil have established space industries. See Twibell,
supra note 1, at 1.
A multitude of other countries are involved in Space. For example, Canada has its
own space agency. Chile also has a space program. Some countries are becoming
involved in space for the sake of their own peoples' survival. Meterological satellites
are crucial for countries such as Ethiopia which need improved weather forecast and
early warning systems to [predict agricultural crises]. Kenya requires remote sensing
for many of the same reasons.
Id. at n.237.
36. See supra note 15.
37. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. II ("Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.").
1997]
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The 1967 Space Treaty sought to instill into international law a
common consensus of views on the proper course for humanity to take in
space endeavors. The concepts it developed would permeate all
international law that followed." The basic concepts it instilled into
customary international law were the following:
1) Freedom of exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies;
2) Non-appropriation of outer space or celestial bodies;
3) Exploration and use of outer space and celestial bodies in accordance
with the fundamental principles of international law, including the
basic principles of the United Nations Charter;
4) Partial demilitarization of outer space and total militarization of
celestial bodies;
5) Retention by states of sovereign rights over space objects launched;
6) International responsibility of states for national activities in space,
including liability for damage caused by space objects;
7) Prevention of potentially harmful consequences of experiments in
outer space and on celestial bodies;
8) Assistance to personnel of spacecraft in the event of accident, distress,
or emergency landing; and
9) International cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space and celestial bodies.19
Most of these concepts will not be dealt with herein. However, it
must be noted that states retain jurisdiction and ownership of satellites and
spacecraft. Therefore, some level of property rights do exist, but only on
38. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XIII which states that it would affect all
law and space activities as articulated in the following.
The provisions of this treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties of the Treaty
in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to the Treaty or
jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on within the
framework of international inter-governmental organizations. Any practical questions
arising in connection with activities carried on by international inter-governmental
organizations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the States Parties to the Treaty either with the
appropriate international organization, which are parties to this Treaty..
Id.
39. GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 39-40 (1984)
(Professors Zhukov and Kolosov are former soviet scholars who played a role in the development
of international space law and have analyzed this treaty extensively).
40. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. VII. See also, text accompanying note 39.
It is this type of jurisdiction that is analogous to maritime law where states retain jurisdiction
over their ocean-going vessels in international waters. For a more extensive analysis of the
analogies between maritime law and space law, see GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P.
MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 27-47 (1989). There are also
analogies to the law regarding Antarctica. See Beattie v. United States, 756 F.2d 91, 99 (1985)
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the spacecraft itself. Thus, a lunar colony or facility would likely have its
sender nation, or nations, retain jurisdiction over it. However, if it
becomes a mining operation, would the parameters immediately adjoining
the facility and the mined material, once it is removed, become the
property of the sender nation(s)? That is the issue where space
entrepreneurs become concerned. Hence, the main concept is the non-
appropriation of outer space or celestial bodies as Professors Zhukov and
Kolosov have termed the no-sovereignty provision.
The no-sovereignty provision is Article II of the Space Treaty. It
explicitly states that "[oluter space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means."4  This provision,
along with the other less- or non restraining concepts (regarding space
industrial development), has replicated itself throughout international law.
Most international multilateral 2  and bilateral agreements' 3  contain
references to the 1967 Space Treaty, and, invariably, the no-sovereignty
provision contained within the Treaty has spread, infecting all international
law and domestic law following it. Even if a treaty or law does not
contain reference to the 1967 Space Treaty or no-sovereignty provision, it
is still guided by it because the 1967 Space Treaty has become part of the
(noting that the legal framework governing Antarctica is frequently analogized to the law of outer
space). Moreover, not only are the principles analogous, but the wording from the 1967 Space
Treaty was borrowed from the Antarctic Treaty and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. See Twibell,
supra note 1, at 3.
41. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21.
42. Most international legal multilateral treaty documents cited herein refer to the 1967
Space Treaty: 1968 Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement, supra note 23, preamble
(noting the importance of the 1967 Space Treaty and "desiring to develop and giver further
concrete expression of [those] duties. . ." within the 1967 Space Treaty); 1972 Convention on
International Liability, supra note 23, preamble ("recalling" the 1967 Space Treaty); 1975
Registration Convention, supra note 23, preamble ("recalling" 1967 Space Treaty and noting
how the 1967 Space Treaty reaffirms the idea that states bear responsibility for their spacecraft
(presumably referring to Article VII of the 1967 Space Treaty)); and the Convention on the
International Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), supra note 27, preamble ("considering the
relevant provisions" of the 1967 Space Treaty); 1979 Moon Treaty, supra note 23, preamble
("recalling" the 1967 Space Treaty and other space treaties--although it seeks to strengthen the
no-sovereignty provision). Although some treaties, such as The Operating Agreement Relating
to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), supra note 31, do
not explicitly refer to the 1967 Space Treaty, the Treaty is part of customary international law,
and therefore, if any of the aspect of such agreement still operates within the confines of the
Space Treaty. See infra text accompanying note 44.
43. See European, Japanese, and Canadian Space Station Agreement, supra note 28,
preamble (including the four major multi-lateral space treaties and specifically, the 1967 Space
Treaty); U.S./Italy Space Station Agreement, supra note 28, Preamble (recognizing the 1967
Space Treaty and specifically its Article III).
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customary international law." In conclusion, the virus is the no-
sovereignty provision in the 1967 Space Treaty and it has spread
throughout the global legal framework.41 Before addressing what vaccine
can be used to disinfect international law of this virus, some specific issues
and changes will be presented because if changes in the corpus juris
spatialis are to be employed, it is necessary to be specific about what
changes are needed instead of the simply calling for the elimination of the
no-sovereignty provision. Otherwise, where now there is some
44. It has been said that the formation of treaties itself is the result of customary practice.
See MARK E. VILLAGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 29 (1985).
Although developments and practices in regards to outer space can hardly be regarded as
customary, certainly the analogies and origins derived from the law of Antarctica and the sea
have customary origins. This paper advocates that indeed the 1967 Space Treaty and its no-
sovereignty provision are part of not only statutory international law, but customary international
law because, first, it is the cornerstone of four treaties that unanimously adhere to it in their
preambles. See supra note 42. Secondly, these four documents are considered to be the primary
corpus juris spatialis. See supra note 23. Although there was no "gradual hardening of practice
into law, " id., there was a formation of treaty law that now is common practice. The analysis
here may seem to be more proper in discussing the effect of a treaty (here, the 1967 Space
Treaty) over subsequent law, and indeed that is the next issue, however, space law development
is unique to over areas of law. It never had a chance to develop customary law before that
custom became ingrained in treaties. Unlike the oceans and polar regions, space was not being
explored and settled for centuries before the advent of law. Rather, space law practically arose
simultaneously with exploration. Technological and financial restraints made space travel a rare
occurrence allowing the legal system, in one of very few instances, to catch up or develop at the
at the same pace of an entirely new endeavor (although this paper advocates that it now, or will
very soon fall behind in space development). Therefore, space law has given rise to the
simultaneous formation of both treaty law and customary law. This conclusion is important
because it removes the additional analysis of determining whether the customary rule or the
treaty prevails. See cf. id. at 34.
Professor Verdross mentions one main process for a rule to go through in order to be
considered customary international law and it has three stages: (1) States engage in a given
practice or whatever reason; (2) states react to other state action in adhering or not adhering to
the practice "in the expectation that other states still again accord reciprocity;" and (3) the law
becomes customary law by states not only adhering to the rule but stating that it is a rule. Id. at
29-30. Have these rules occurred in respect to no-sovereignty? Well, that is difficult to
determine at least for the second two stages. It was stated as a rule first via treaty law and no
states have violated the Treaty, so it is difficult to determine how states will react. However, no-
sovereignty began the space age in the form of treaty law which has been adhered to for 30
years. It at the very least approaches customary international law. Finally, the 1967 Space
Treaty tends to state existing law from the analogous areas of law such as maritime law and the
law of Antarctica.
45. The United States Constitution mandates that "all Treaties . . .shall be the supreme
law of the Land." JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 51
(1996) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. In 1796, George Washington recognized that "every
Treaty [properly ratified] ...thenceforward becomes the law of the land." Id. See Edwin W.
Paxson, III, Note, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: Space Law and Economic
Development, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 487 (1993).
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uncertainty, without the clause and nothing to replace it, uncertainty would
be resoundingly present-'
The need for the industrialization of outer space has been briefly
established,'7 and if any argument remains, a thorough analysis of that
issue should be left for a separate discussion. ' At this point, the need for a
change in the legal framework supporting space industrialization is going
to be assumed. Accordingly, the legal discussion now turns to what exact
changes are desired to promote outer space development.
IV. DESIRED CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW:
IDENTIFYING THE VIRUS
The changes in international space law required for vigorous space
development can also be the subject of in-depth discussion. However,
since this paper focuses on how to implement changes, those changes are
going to be very brief and are hoped to be commonsensical, at least as it
relates to the premise of this paper. The following are the specific changes
generally recommended to be instituted in international space law:
1) Appropriation of celestial property to national or private entities at
some agreed upon level. The agreed upon level should, at a minimum,
include the ownership of mining operations, mining claims, mined
material once removed, and reasonable parameters of mining
operations;' 9
2) Determination of liability in automated and replicating systems;4' and
46. The counter argument of this proposition is that states or entities could own celestial
property after the removal of this provision. However, as discussed in supra note 44,
restrictions of ownership could be part of customary international law. Although if such a
provision's removal indeed perceived enough support to make its removal possible, certainly that
fact would support the creation of customary law. However, if it was not replaced even with an
affirmative approval of celestial property rights, the only clear indication would be uncertainty on
the status of property rights and thus, uncertainty would continue although property rights
advocate would have one more argument in their favor.
47. For an indepth discussion of the need for property rights in space and how they would
increase incentive for investment, see Twibell, supra note 1, and Keefe, supra note 2. See also
supra text accompanying notes 3-14.
48. See Twibell, supra note 1; Keefe, supra note 2. See generally Reynolds, supra note
2.
49. See supra note 2; Wayne N. White, Jr., Mining Law for Outer Space in SPACE
MANUFACTURING 8: ENERGY & MATERIALS FROM SPACE 83 (Barbara Faughnan & Gregg
Marniak eds., 1991).
50. See NASA CONFERENCE PUBLICATION 2255, ADVANCED AUTOMATION FOR SPACE
MISSIONS 189 (Robert A. Freitas, Jr. & William P. Gilbreath eds., 1982) (demonstrating the
feasibility, design, and implications of a self-replicating lunar factory); Ty S. Twibell,
Comment, Replicators and the Law: Analysis of the Legal Consequences of Replicating
Nanotechnology, UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 1997). See also supra note 15 (discussing legal
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3) Formation of an international regime to oversee space activities,
address technical issues, and enforce international space regulation."1
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN INSTITUTING CHANGE IN
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: DEVELOPING A VACCINE
There are a number of vaccines available to rid international space
law of legal viruses. In international legal thinking, many vaccines are
available to combat, for whatever reason, treaty-made law. These vaccines
are variations of the terms modification or termination.2  Termination"3
could be used quite properly as a vaccine. However, it makes no sense to
simply terminate a provision when the true objective is to improve the law,
making it adaptable to new issues entirely unseen in human history. There
must be something to replace the no-sovereignty provision's absence. That
rationale is exactly the purpose behind the preceding section above 5 -
including changes that not only remove the sovereignty provision, but the
additional framework creating legal certainty for space industrialists and
perhaps, society as well. Therefore, legal attempts to remove the no-
sovereignty provision for its own sake are inadequate. However, since
United States unilateral action is one possible route for the 1967 Space
Treaty's modification, the United States could certainly terminate its own
obligations and provide answers to the additional issue through its
municipal law. Hence, a termination analysis will be provided as a
subcategory of unilateral action analysis below."
Fortunately, legal thought in this area is well-developed. This
obviousness is based on the fact that probably the most difficult issue in
international law's young history'- is enforcing state compliance57 to what
repercussions of replicating systems and nanotechnology); Thomas L. McKendree, Planning
Scenarios for Space Development in SPACE MANUFACTURING 10 (Barbara Faughnan & Gregg
Marniak, eds., 1996) (providing hypothetical situations involving "squatters" claiming celestial
property with great ease despite the property right constraints of international space law because
of technological advances in replicating nanotechnology). See generally Fredrick A. Fiedler &
Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 593 (1994).
51. For authors asserting the formation of some sort of legal regime to oversee property
right distribution, see Keefe, supra note 2; Baca, supra note 2 (concluding that the "efficient and
equitable property system on Earth . . .should be extended into space for the exploitation of
celestial resources"); Paxson, supra note 45.
52. See generally LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 484 (3d ed. 1993).
53. See id.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 128-135.
56. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52.
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little international law that exists.,' A survey of a variety of international
literature leads now to the following two commonsensical methods of
changing international space law:
1) United States unilateral action - including the subcategories rebus sic
stantibus (reinterpretation), and unilateral denunciation (termination of
treaty); and
2) multilateral action - developing a new treaty to supersede the 1967
Space Treaty; and Amendment to the 1967 Space Treaty. 9
Strategies for vaccination should first begin with the simplest and
less revolutionary of doctrines which require the least amount of state
concerted effort - United States unilateral action.
A. United States Unilateral Action
1. Vaccine I: Implementing the Rebus sic Stantibus Doctrine"
Rebus sic Stanibus is a doctrine that reminiscent of contract law in
that it states that circumstances of the contracting parties may change to
57. This proposition does not pertain to the seriousness of this problem, because for the
most part, nations do comply with international law. See Professor Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Preface
in BHEK PATI SINHA, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR VIOLATIONS
OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY XIX (1966); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the
Success of International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47-48 (1995)
(noting the general view that "international law is a monument to successful laws, without
requiring much enforcement"). The widespread compliance with international law is probably
due to the fact that international law is simply an embodiment of what nations do and have done
over a long period of time. See HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW POLITICS, VALUES AND
FUNCTIONS, in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 1-2 (stating "International Law . . . is a
construct of norms, standards, principles, institutions, and procedures."). So, rather, the
proposition embodies the "difficulty" of the issue of enforcement. See generally O'Connell,
supra note 67 (discussing the difficulties of enforcing international environmental law).
58. This is comparatively speaking to state domestic law. Because of the increasing
development of international law and increasing global acceptance and participation in the United
Nations over the past twenty years, this proposition may soon be negated.
59. Multilateral action certainly could have the same subcategories as United States
unilateral action. However, the analysis of those subcategories demonstrates they would fail for
the United States. Correspondingly, multilateral actions would fail for the same reasons. See
infra text accompanying notes 62-136. Therefore, it would be impractical to repeat the analysis
for multi-lateral action.
60. The use of this concept in changing international law was taken from DANIEL PATRICK
O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1965) (presenting the doctrine as a legal possibility
for "revision of treaties."). See also International Law Commission Report in HENKIN, supra
note 52, at 516, 517 ("[T]he acceptance of this doctrine [rebus sic stantibus] in international law
is so considerable that it seems to indicate a recognition of a need for this safety-valve in the law
of treaties."); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Iran, 1952 I.C.J. 93, 126 (stating that rebus sic stantibus
is a well-known concept in international law).
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such an extent that their obligation to each other ends.6 This doctrine
might provide the basis for interpreting the 1967 Space Treaty to allow
some degree of property rights in space. Professor Daniel Patrick
O'Connell claims Phillimore describes rebus sic stantibus best in the
following excerpt: "When that state of things which was essential to, and
the moving cause, the promise or engagement, has undergone a material
change, or has ceased, the foundation of the promise or engagement is
gone and their obligation has ceased."62
Although this is a valid doctrine, many commentators frown on its
use because treaty formation is largely based on political notions and
"changes in political circumstances are notoriously difficult to assess."63
Further, problems result from partially performed contracts and equitable
adjustment.' Most importantly, perhaps, is the risk to security of
treaties. 5 However, domestic courts have occasionally found in favor of
rebus sic stantibus under the use of executive abrogation." In more recent
cases, although its recognition is accepted, it seldom is the winning factor
for private parties.67 International courts recognize the doctrine, but have
never ruled in its favor."
Professor O'Connell is correct in his assertion regarding the
inequity and difficulty in determining change in political climates, which
should be obstacles against a proper decision favoring rebus sic stantibus.
61. See, e.g., O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 296.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. International Law Commission Report, in HENKIN, supra note 52, at 516.
66. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 299 (citing Hooper v. U.S., 22 Ct. Cl. 408
(1887)).
67. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 52, at 519.
The U.S. Supreme Court [has] recognized that a party to a treaty might invoke
changed circumstances as an excuse for terminating its treaty obligations. However,
when the states continue to assert the vitality of the treaty, a private person who finds
the continued existence of the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the doctrine of
changed circumstances.
Id. (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
68. See id. (International Tribunals, while recognizing the principle of rebus sic stantibus
have generally avoided giving it affect, usually on the ground that it was not applicable to the
facts on hand (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, cmt. to art. 153 (1965)); O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 299 (citing Russia v. Turkey,
Scott, 1 H.C.R. 297, 317 (1916)); Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, 1925 P.C.I.J.,
(Ser. B) No. 4, at 29 (Feb. 7); Ser. C., No. 2, 140, 187 (1923); A.J., THE PERMANENCE OF
TREATIES (1928). The modern trend upholds O'Connell's assertion since his 1965 text. See
generally Denmark v. Norway, 1993 I.C.J. 38, 217 (June 14); Nicaragua v. United States, 1984
I.C.J. 392, 621 (Nov. 26); Belgium v. Spain, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 310 (Feb. 5).
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However, the situation of today's post-Cold War world is perhaps less
difficult. In fact, it is so drastically different from other political
environments, that it may give the strong, legally valid, although seldom
successful, rebus sic stantibus a fighting chance to receive credence.
In beginning the analysis of rebus sic stantibus, the definition to be
used will be the International Court of Justice's 1949 articulation of res sic
stantibus which, unlike Phillmore, is in much simpler terms. It states that
"[a] state may refuse to execute a treaty if the conditions have substantially
changed."6 9 To analyze the phrase substantially changed, the International
Court of Justice in Cambodia v. Thailand stated that rebus sic stantibus
"contemplates two different situations: the one existing when the treaty
was signed and the new one created by conditions and circumstances
posterior to the treaty."70
First, the circumstances during the time of the formation of the
1967 Space Treaty should be brought to light. The change from that
environment to today's environment is very clear. Only two superpowers
existed - the United States and the Soviet Union. Both nations possessed
massive military industrial complexes and economies 71 capable of vigorous
space programs, and were the only two space powers at the time. They
were already in conflict in many areas on earth - the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, and the Cuban Missile Crises were the most notable
examples of major Soviet Union/United States confrontations. Soviet
President Nikoli Krushev was famous for his mighty display at a session of
the United Nations General Assembly, where he removed his shoe and
struck it on the table, shouting that the Soviet Union would crush the
United States. This mood permeated well into the 1980s, when President
Ronald Reagan referred to citizenry of the Soviet Union as barbarians.
Star Wars was also a major issue during the Reagan Era and it epitomized
the extension of the Cold War confrontation into outer space. Never had
the world witnessed a political conflict guide world policy to such a
fantastic degree. It has been stated that the effect of the Cold War and
superpower rivalry was one of the principle reasons behind the
development of the no-sovereignty provision.
69. The Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4, 41 (Apr. 9).
70. Cambodia v. Thailand, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 42 (June 15).
71. The proposition that the United States has the largest economy in the world is
undisputable. However, in light of today's understanding of the Soviet Union's economic
condition throughout its brief history, especially since its weak economy substantially contributed
to its downfall, the proposition in regards to the Soviet Union. may seem less valid.
Nevertheless, this same Soviet Union had one of the most massive economies based on its sheer
size and total volume of currency regardless of how its relatively weak economy compared to
smaller nations.
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The no-sovereignty provision was viewed as the means of
preventing the spread of the Cold War into space, as well as resulting
territorial claims by the United States and the Soviet Union while non-
space faring nations stood idly by.7 2 Certainly times have changed. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics no longer exists. The Cold War is
gone and has been for some time. There could not be a clearer
demarcation of a change in the political arena. Certainly, Professor
O'Connell and others would agree. Further, other substantial global
changes have taken place since the advent of the 1967 Space Treaty. Not
only has the Cold War ceased, but more and more nations have developed
the technological and economic capability to become space faring nations. 7
Professor Reynolds has eloquently articulated the mood of this new era:
Today, space is not the sole preserve of the United States
and the Soviet Union (or its successor states). A potent
European space program now exists. Japan has a rapidly
growing program, and Third-World opinion leaders like
China, India, and Brazil have important space programs
too. Nor are these states the only ones. Although the
programs of the United States and the former Soviet Union
retain significant leads, those leads no longer appear
unassailable. When significant exploitation of space
resources begins, many nations will be participating . 7
It would seem that times have dramatically changed since the
signing of the 1967 Space Treaty. Political tides and economic boundaries
have shifted dramatically that fact is clear. However, substantial argument
exists against supporting the removal of the no-sovereignty provision via
rebus sic stantibus.
Although third-world economies have improved to the extent that
many have viable space industries,7 5 they are nowhere near approaching the
level of space infrastructure possessed by the United States, or the former
Soviet provinces - namely Russia. The People's Republic of China, at
least in potential, has already demonstrated a strong presence in the
commercial launch market. 76 Nations such as Kenya or Australia could
72. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 229-30.
73. See GOLDMAN, Supra note 8, at 110; Reynolds, supra note 2, at 231; Twibell, supra
note 1, at 33-34.
74. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 231.
75. The following countries have viable space industries: Brazil, China, India, Israel,
Pakistan, the Ukraine, Australia, Canada, and Japan. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 1, n.5.
76. See John C. Garcia, Heaven or Hell: The Future of United States Launch Services
Industry, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 333, 341-42 (1994).
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theoretically launch a spacecraft and claim part of the moon and perhaps
begin a mining operation, but what Kenya could do, the United States
would certainly be capable of doing many times over and faster. The
United States or other conglomerate of nations, such as the European
Space Agency would certainly begin reaping profits long before Kenya
ever would. Third-world nations are not in a different situation than thirty
years ago. They are certainly close equals to the space powers regarding
such space endeavors as telecommunications and spacecraft launching,
however, such participation in the space industry is minuscule in
comparison to the economic and technological requirements of an Apollo-
like mission to the Moon. The Apollo Missions were draining on the
massive United States economy and required the concerted effort of the
richest nation on Earth. Today, such an endeavor would still be very
expensive for the United States. Professor Reynolds is correct that third-
world countries have vigorous space industries, but in regards to a
situation existing where they would directly benefit from celestial property
claims, that notion is unrealistic - third-world nations are likely to be
equally as skeptical of space power domination of space as they were
twenty or thirty years ago. Moreover, there are four space powers which
exist today.78
The assertion that a third-world resistance to property rights in
space probably still exists should not be confused with the likelihood of
implementing changes in space law or policy or whether third-world
opinion should have such a substantial impact on the acts of the major
space powers. The assertion only demonstrates the argument that
circumstances may not have fundamentally changed in certain respects for
triggering the rebus sic stantibus doctrine.
There are two arguments remaining against rebus sic stantibus
which have not been put forth. The first is that the assumption that the no-
sovereignty provision being based on Cold War fears and superpower
domination of space may not be the only substantial reason for the
inclusion of the no-sovereignty provision in the 1967 Space Treaty. One
strong reason for its inclusion is the notion of peace in space - the desire
not to bring man's problems into space with him, and most notably, the res
communis doctrine.
77. Kenya has demonstrated a vital need for remote sensing for predicting disastrous
weather conditions for agriculture. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 34, n.237.
78. The four major space powers are the United States, Russia, Japan, and Europe (as the
European Space Agency). See Twibell, supra note 1, at 16 (citing GOLDMAN, supra note 8, at
15).
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Res communis means that certain property should belong to all
people of the world. 9 This concept applied to outer space is generally
accepted., Further, treaties and bilateral agreements seem to support this
notion. Truly, the great deal of expense involved in space activities is
likely to prevent one nation from acting in such a manner and violating the
res communis character of space. This fact allows the commonly held
perception of res communis to remain, perceptively leaving no room for
visible deviation from the doctrine. Thus, if the no-sovereignty provision
is rooted in the res communis doctrine rather that the then existence of the
two super powers and since nations have not appeared to deviate from that
doctrine, the fact that times have changed in regard to the Cold War may
have no meaning in the rebus sic stantibus analysis.'
79. Res Communis in international space law is a combination of res ominwn communis
(meaning community ownership rather than a general right-of-use law) and res extra
commercium ("applied typically to the peacetime use of the high seas without claims of
ownership, special exclusive interests, or unilateral control."). See S. HOUSTON LAY &
HOWARD J. TAUBENFIELD, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTvmTES OF MAN IN SPACE, 52-53
(1970).
80. See generally supra note 2.
81. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations provides a basis for analysis for the use of "fundamental change of
circumstances" that is much more extensive than the International Court of Justice put forth in
Cambodia. It sets forth the following guidelines:
1) A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not
be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the
parties to be bound by the treaty; and
b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
2) A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty between two or more States and one or more international
organizations if the treaty establishes a boundary.
3) A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from a treaty if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party
invoking it either or an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation
owed to any other party to the treaty.
4) If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke
the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations, Feb.
18-March 21, 1986, art. 62, 25 I.L.M. at 576-77
The end of the superpower struggle of demise of either the United States or the U.S.S.R. was
probable very unforeseen. It definitely shocked the world until very close to the time the Soviet
Union did fall. And certainly, the change was of "fundamental character." However, the third
prong of the Restatement test is where the argument above fails as well, see supra text
accompanying notes 71-85, that the change in circumstances must be "an essential basis to be
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The second argument against rebus sic stantibus is the most severe.
Both the International Court of Justice 2 and commentary agree 3 that the
presence of withdrawal provisions in treaties negates the need for rebus sic
stantibus because most modem treaties have a provision where states can
seek a legal out. The 1967 Space Treaty has such a provision: "any State
Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one
year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depository
Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of
receipt of this notification.""
With this clause, the contractual provision is instilled for proper
and internationally recognized denunciation. Simply, if the United States
bound by the treaty." The 1967 Space Treaty makes no mention of the superpower presence.
The superpower aspects seems, and probably rightfully so, to be a theory built on intuition. The
res communis character or reasoning behind the no-sovereignty provision seems to be more
firmly rooted in the actual text of the treaty, and certainly times have not changed in regard to
those principles. Note the following provisions from the Treaty:
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the
benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific
development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as well as the
legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mutual
understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and people.
1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, preamble. "The exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the
province of all mankind." Id. art. I. As one can easily see, several references are made that
would seem to uphold the res communis basis for the no-sovereignty provision or any other
provision for that matter in the Treaty such as the words peaceful purposes, co-operation,
common interest of all mankind, and benefit of all people irrespective of the degree of economic
or scientific development. Economic and technological developments are still issues of today that
have not left with the absence of the Cold War and no where in the treaty is there any mention of
superpower domination.
82. Modern treaty provisions are inherently terminable. See cf. Nicaragua, 1984 I.C.J.,
392, 621 (Nov. 26). "It is only necessary to look at the texts of the large number of. . . treaties
.. . to see how almost invariably they are concluded either for a fixed term or for renewable
terms subject to right of denunciation, or are made terminable upon notice . . . ." Id.
83. International Law Commission Report in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 517.
The majority of modern treaties are expressed to be of short duration, or are entered
into for recurrent terms of years with a right to denounce the treaty at the end of each
term, or are expressly or implicitly terminable upon notice. In all these cases either
the treaty expires automatically or each party, has the power to terminate the treaty
and has the power also to apply pressure upon the other party to revise its provisions.
Id.
84. 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XVI.
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decided that it should have property rights and wanted to exercise those
rights, it could do so a year after withdrawing from the 1967 Treaty.
However, the United States certainly might experience international
political repercussions if it behaved in such a way. These repercussions
will be dealt with in depth in a following discussion - United States
denunciation of the 1967 Space Treaty."
a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine I
The rebus sic stantibus doctrine fails to be an effective vaccine for
the sought-after changes in international space law. Times have
substantially changed, however, those times may not be the reason behind
the no-sovereignty provision. If they were, it is not included in the
preamble. It only exists in the realm of scholarly thought. Also, many
third-world nations would likely object to the sudden creation of property
rights without some sort of structure development outside of simple
reinterpretation. Finally, the withdrawal provision negates the need in
modern times for the implementation of rebus sic stantibus.
2. Vaccine II: Reinterpretation of the No-sovereignty Provision" -
150 Year-Old Treaty Interpretation Analysis Applied to the Space
Age
Probably one of the easiest methods of reconciling the difficulties
of the 1967 Space Treaty is simply reinterpreting the Treaty, condoning a
certain level of celestial property rights. Reinterpretation would have
85. See infra text accompanying notes 128-136.
86. See MONSIEUR DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 260-61 (1852) (discussing
methods of treaty interpretation and exceptions to prior conceived interpretation of treaties (rebus
sic stantibus)); HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 473, n.2, n.3 (a unilateral interpretation of a
treaty has an "advisory" effect (citing Ste. Ruegger et Boutet v. Ste. Weber et Howad, [1933-34]
Ann. Dig. 404 (No. 179) (Trib. Civ. de la Seine, France), whereas if most or all of the
signatories interpret a treaty in a certain way it is an authentic interpretation having almost the
binding effect of an additional clause to the treaty.) Cf. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 282-83
(referring to travaux pr'paratoires--looking to the intent of the parties at the time the document
was signed--while noting that its danger was that "[s]tates which adhere to a treaty after it has
been formulated are bound by an abstraction expressed in words independent of the intent of
those who shaped the treaty.") Thus, even if the intent of the parties at the signing of the 1967
Space Treaty was against any form of national property rights, the words themselves are the
deciding factor--if there is room for property rights in the words of the Treaty, there is room for
interpreting the Treaty in such a fashion regardless of the intent of the signatories.
The Restatement states that treaty interpretation depends on whether the parties have
agreed to accept a particular entity's interpretation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 148(1) (1965). Otherwise, it is not binding. d. §
148(2). However, as the Restatement indicates, it is the interpretation that affects the effect of
the agreement or treaty. See id. § 146.
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substantially fewer intricacies than amending the Treaty" or creating an
entirely new one.u In addition, it would pose fewer international
repercussions 9 and less time, which would be required for formulating and
passing a new legal regime with a global consensus. Moreover, treaty
reinterpretation is a generally accepted method of treaty modification. °
However, before a nation, or nations, can lawfully interpret a treaty, a
certain state of things is required. 9' What does certain state of things
mean?
Certain state of things refers to legal rules of treaty interpretation.
De Vattel recognized that certain maxims for treaty interpretation must
exist.Y Due to the lack of precision of the written word and language in
general.n Without these maxims, treaty interpretation would be subject to
much abuse by the selfish motives of the signing parties.9 The four
general maxims of treaty interpretation as designed by De Vattel almost
150 years ago are as follows:
I. Interpret only that which needs interpretation.
II. If a party has certain interpretations of a treaty or provision and they
had a full opportunity to assert such interpretations at the signing of
the treaty and did not, it is to their own detriment.
III. Signatories do not have a right to interpret treaties according to their
own "fancy."
IV. What is sufficiently declared is to be taken as true.
V. The interpretation ought to be made according to certain rules."
87. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47 (discussing Vaccine V - amending the 1967
Space Treaty).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 138-42 (discussing Vaccine IV - changing or
nullifying the 1967 Space Treaty by passing a new and different treaty).
89. As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 112-27, the accepted method of treaty
interpretation by its very nature should at the most create minimal negative international reaction.
90. See supra note 86.
91. See DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 261.
92. See id. at 244-74.
93. See id. at 243-44.
94. "[F]raud seeks to take advantage even of the imperfection of language, and that men,
designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, in order to be provided with a
pretense for eluding them upon occasion." Id. at 244.
95. Id. at 244-46. The first three maxims were paraphrased from the originally written
following maxims: "lst general maxim: it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of
interpretation."; "2d general maxim: if he who could and ought to have explained himself has
not done it, it is to his own detriment."; and "3d general maxim: Neither of the contracting
parties has a right to interpret the treaty according to his own fancy." Id. at 244-45.
De Vattel's rules for treaty interpretation are used for illustration because it makes for
an interesting analysis of judging space age dilemmas with an analysis developed over 150 years
ago when automobiles did not even exist. His standards are still valid and virtually the same.
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De Vattel outlines some of the certain rules referred to in his fifth maxim.
For example, whenever obscurity in language occurs, one must look to the
ideas of those who drew up the deed, and interpret it accordingly.9
Regarding the meaning of terms, common usage guides." Interpretation
leading to absurdity should be rejected. 9 Absurdities would likely include
contradiction of one portion of a treaty to another portion rendering it
inconsistent or invalid.99 In terms of a rule relating to interpreting the no-
Note the similarity of the Restatement's criteria for treaty interpretation as compared to De
Vattel's analysis discussed herein (compare the general maxims and other rules required by the
fifth maxim infra text accompanying notes 112-27; see also DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 267-
74 (establishing 10 more specific rules of treaty interpretation similar of the Restatement Second
as articulated below):
Criteria for Interpretation:
1) International law requires that the interpretive process ascertain and give effect to
the purpose of the international agreement which, as appears form the terms used by
the parties, it was intended to serve. The factors to be taken into account by way of
guidance in the interpretive process include:
(a) the ordinary meaning of the words of the agreement in the context in which they
are used;
(b) the title given the agreement and statements of purpose and scope included in the
text;
(c) the circumstances attending the negotiation of the agreement;
(d) drafts and other documents submitted for consideration, action taken on them, and
the official record of the deliberations during the course of the negotiation;
(e) unilateral statements of understanding made by a signatory before the agreement
came into effect, to the extent that they were communicated to, or otherwise known
to, the other signatory or signatories;
(f) the subsequent practice of the parties in the performance of the agreement, or the
subsequent practice of one party, if the other party or parties knew or had reason to
know of it;
(g) change of circumstances;
(h) the comparability of alternative interpretations of the agreement with (i) the
obligations of the parties to other states under general international law and other
international agreements of the parties, and (ii) the principles of law common to the
legal systems of the parties or of all states having reasonably developed legal systems;
(i) comparison of the texts in the different languages in which the agreement was
concluded, taking into account any provision in the agreement as to the
authoritiveness of the different texts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 147 (1965).
96. Id. at 247
97. Id. at 248.
98. Id.
99. See id. This is an old concept forming the legal Latin phrase ornis interpretatio si
fieri potest ira fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietatis amoveantur, or "[elvery
interpretation, if it can be done, is be so made in instruments that all contradictions may be
removed.* BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (6th ed. 1990).
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sovereignty provision of the 1967 Space Treaty, interpretations should be
guided by the "reason of the ... treaty.'0
According to De Vattel, there is one main exception to these rules.
This exception is analogous to rebus sic stantibus, termed by De Vattel in
this instance as conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus.'0' Recall
rebus sic stantibus: That state of things alone, in consideration of which
promise was made, is essential to the promise; and it is only by a change in
that state, that the effect of the promise can be lawfully prevented or
suspended.10n Therefore, if reinterpretation of the 1967 Space Treaty's no-
sovereignty provision cannot pass analysis under the rules of treaty
interpretation, the exception to the standard rules on treaty interpretation
remains. But first, the determination of whether the no-sovereignty
provision can be reinterpreted.
a. First General Maxim: It Is Not Allowable to Interpret What Has No
Need of Interpretation03
The no-sovereignty provision probably has plenty of room for
interpretation. Note the clause again: "outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means."'°0
The first part of Article II makes clear that all space objects - moons,
asteroids, comets - and even empty space itself, is the target of the action
or command. Issues will arise if objects are removed, such as by mining
or some other sort of extraction. The words "is not subject to national
appropriation" are vague. For example, appropriation could mean to
include a variety of celestial body utilizations. '0 It could mean merely
physical occupation or any other sort of taking. '-i However, the words
have a qualifier, by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation
and by any other means must certainly be descriptive of claim of
sovereignty because they define possible modes of claiming sovereignty.
Thus, a taking in the guise of a national taking - a national control at
some level over outer space or any celestial body is prohibited. These
100. DE VATrEL, supra note 86, at 255.
101. Id. at 261-62. The Restatement has the same exception. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) supra note 95, § 153 cmt. ("[Section 153] is often referred to as the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus.").
102. Id.
103. Id. at 244.
104. 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. II.
105. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 101 (6th ed. 1990) (adhering to the general rule of
common usage of terms). See text accompanying notes 96-100.
106. Id.
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types of takings or appropriations are described with very broad, over-
inclusive terms. The provision basically in a sense states that states may
not exercise any control over empty space or any celestial body.
In a strict sense, this clause has already been violated in the past,
and will certainly be violated in a direct way in the future. Further it is
impossible not to violate the provision. The Apollo lunar landing for a
time took direct control by the United States of a very small portion of the
Moon for a very small amount of time. Realistically, even a strict
interpretationist of the no-sovereignty provision would probably not object.
Although the United States placed its flag there, it made no claim of
sovereignty - it was merely symbolic. However, future plans will do the
same, but the operation will be larger and will last over a longer period of
time. What would a strict no-sovereignty provision interpreter say then?
The coming international space station ° will in effect be taking up
a portion of empty space by use, occupation, and any other means -
although under the jurisdiction of a conglomerate of states instead of one as
the clause seems to semantically direct. If empty space is not clearly
demonstrative, imagine the implications of a lunar or Martian colony.
Those endeavors would undoubtedly challenge the no-sovereignty
provision. For one, it would be somewhat permanent. Even if it only
lasted for a few months or years, the effect would be taking a portion of
the Moon under United States claim of national sovereignty according to
the plain language of the Treaty. At first, retention of United States
jurisdiction would be less problematic if the first stage of the lunar colony
was launched from Earth. Then the vehicle as it first becomes a colony
could arguably retain a ship/vessel type of national jurisdiction consistent
with Article VII of the Space Treaty. However, gradually the line will
become more obscure as additional modules are built and connected to the
original earth-launched vehicle or as the original vehicle becomes
entrenched into the lunar surface. When does it stop becoming a lunar
vehicle and become a colony? Once it becomes a colony, does Article VII
cover those types of situations? Complicating matters further, what would
be the impact of replicating nanotechnology - a technology that does not
mine the Moon, but rather, converts lunar material into itself?
Thus, a situation develops where maritime-vessel type jurisdiction
might exist at the first launched component, but the component replicates
and converts non-sovereign material into sovereign material.
Macrotechnological replicating facilities likely could be classified as an
initial space craft, but the more probable implementation of
nanotechnology is more difficult. Nanotechnology functions at a molecular
107. See supra note 28 (bilateral agreements regarding space station).
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level. Would the introduction of nanotechnology on the Moon likely be
classified as a space craft, a man-made type of pseudo-biological
substance, or something else entirely?
Most commentators, space law theorists, and third-world interests
have predicted similar ambiguity in the 1967 Space Treaty and its difficulty
in applying to new realities of space development such as celestial mining,
therefore believing the 1967 Space Treaty requires revision or that a new
treaty should be implemented. The 1979 Moon Treaty is an example of
some of those concerns. Although maritime law analogy does not
effectively address space issues such as colonization, 1° Antarctic law could
foreseeably answer questions. Antarctica is a sovereignless territory and
many countries have installations not unlike colonies within which they
retain national jurisdiction. However, adjudication would only uncover
and implement such analogy because no reference to these procedures or
applicable Antarctic law is mentioned in any space treaty, much less the
1967 Space Treaty. Moreover, some other issues remain. For example,
when celestial mining becomes feasible, will mining countries have to split
the profits? Once a substantial portion of a celestial body has the potential
to be mined or begins to create large profits, could third-world nations cite
to the preamble and article I asserting that regardless of their economic or
technological status that they should be entitled to the benefits of the
exploitation? °0
In conclusion, the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision
does include much vagueness worthy of interpretation. This vagueness has
been demonstrated by both semantics and potential application to old and
new scenarios. At the time the 1967 Space Treaty was formed, mining
celestial bodies was viewed as a near-future event. However, now celestial
property issues will be imminent within the next ten or twenty years and
the time for reinterpretation is ripe.
108. Cf. Jefferson H. Weaver, Illusion or Reality? State Sovereignty in Outer Space, 10
B.U. INT'L L.J. 20 (1992) (stating that regions of the sea can be claimed by virtue of sovereignty
via fleet domination (or by use of power exercised from the adjacent coast)).
109. One might argue that third-world nations should have access to one or a few exploiting
nations' space industry profits or other rewards. However, since space investment carries much
risk and expense in comparison with other terrestrial investments, entities would even be less
likely to invest knowing they would have to split their hard-earned rewards with nations who
have stood idle. This argument is especially strong when space industry is in its infancy.
Otherwise, no nation may benefit from the rewards of space industry and humanity in general
will suffer a loss. On the other hand, if the United States or other conglomerate of nations
maintains a high-rewarding space industry for many years harming other nations economies with
some sort of monopoly, certainly adjustments may have to be made. But the key is getting hard-
to-start industry started, especially an industry that could be crucial for the survival of mankind.
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b. Second General Maxim: If He Who Could and Ought to Have
Explained Himself Has Not Done It, It Is to His Own Detriment
There is little analysis under this second maxim. If the United
States, or any other nation, had a different interpretation or desire for
property rights in space, there was no evidence supporting this notion.
Rather, almost all were strictly against such notions. Even if there was
any sort of prevailing view on property right concepts, it would be to their
own detriment and thus, ineffective as an excuse for reinterpreting the
Treaty.
c. Third General Maxim: Neither of the contracting parties has a right to
interpret the treaty according to his own fancy
If the United States was the only nation to benefit from a liberal
view of the 1967 Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision, this third
general maxim would negate United States efforts at reinterpretation.
However, as stated above, the reinterpretation should favor all nations, not
just the United States. But many third-world nations would certainly view
the interpretation as only favorable to the space faring nations because of
the economic and technological status of third-world nations. While such
status prevents them from exploring and exploiting space, it is not a valid
argument in determining the why of a nation's own fancy. Thus, despite
potential third-world arguments, a pro property interpretation asserted by,
for example, the United States, would not necessarily be to its own fancy.
The interpretation would benefit all nations, especially when third-
world nations catch up technologically and economically. Further, the
lead taken by the space faring nations would make it easier for third-world
nations to enter the same endeavors. Today's space industry is a firm
example. Once, several nations took a lead in certain industries such as
telecommunications and the commercial launch industry, third-world
nations have entered and are becoming competitive; today, Europe takes a
greater market share of commercial launch contracts over the United
States. Third-world nations reap the benefits of remote sensing and the
Global Positioning System."10 Future space industry would be no different.
The creation of Solar Power Satellites"' would fuel the nations most in
110. The Global Positioning System, (hereinafter GPS), is a constellation of satellites
formerly used by the military that can be used to pinpoint any object's location on Earth within
only a few meters. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 35. BMW and Mercedes Benz, for example,
use the GPS systems for guidance systems in their cars which have detailed road maps with
extreme accuracy which keep track, via satellite, exactly where the car and driver are on the
maps. Id.
111. Solar Power Satellites are technologically feasible satellites that can gather larger
amounts of sunlight in space than on Earth and transmit the energy via microwave back to Earth
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need - third-world nations. Third-world space craft manufacturers could
contract to less expensive space craft or stations to be made in space by the
space faring nations. Hence, space could be more accessible to all nations.
d. Fourth General Maxim: What Is Sufficiently Declared Is to Be Taken
for True
This fourth general maxim analysis includes many arguments in
the first general maxim - if "it is sufficiently declared to be taken for
true" it is probably not overly vague, and therefore, not necessary to
interpret. However, if something is vague, it is difficult to take it for true.
While Article II states that there shall be no claim of national sovereignty
and this should be taken for true, it does not indicate what degree of
sovereignty should exist, such as in the case of colonization. Therefore, if
Article II cannot apply to a given situation with certainty, how can it be
taken for true? This is where any effort at reinterpretation will primarily
lie for it is the near-presence of space ventures and property issues for
which reinterpretation will be sought. However, if any reinterpretation
should happen to include claims for sovereignty where it was claimed a
nation could acquire a portion of the Moon and call it its own, Article II is
clear on this issue and it would certainly be taken for true that a nation
could not make such a claim.
e. Fifth General Maxim: The Interpretation Ought to Be Made According
to Certain Rules
It is not disputed that the interpretation of the no-sovereignty
provision commanding that no nation shall appropriate celestial property is
a valid interpretation (evidenced by. lack of dispute in scholarly work over
this interpretation), 12 but does an interpretation allowing national
appropriation violate certain rules? It probably does not.
For one, interpreting the no-sovereignty provision to include some
level of national appropriation would violate the 1967 Space Treaty's
Preamble and create absurdity and contradictions within the Treaty."3 The
preamble states that "space exploration and use of outer space should be
carried out for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of their economic or
scientific development."" 4  This seems to contradict any notion of the
United States or any other major space power taking a portion of a moon
or asteroid and reaping the rewards of their resources. Thus, this use of
in the form of simple electricity. Id. at 46. Third-world countries would tremendously benefit
from this inexpensive form of energy.
112. But see Reynolds, supra note 2, at 241.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
114. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, preamble.
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outer space would likely be construed as not benefiting peoples in lower
economic and scientific development and therefore violative of the
provision.
Secondly, Article I would be contradicted.'" Article I transforms
the portions of the Preamble immediately discussed above into
commands."' It also states that all areas of "the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind on the basis of equality."" 7  A major mining
operation on the Moon retaining jurisdiction and ownership over mined
material certainly would easily entertain arguments that other states were
being deprived of their use and exploration of that area. The larger the
colony and the more lucrative the industry, the more likely the argument
would prevail. Thus far, the interpretation creating limited property rights
would seem to contradict other provisions in the Space Treaty, violating
general rules of treaty interpretation and the notion of omnis interpretatio
si fieri potest ita fienda est in instrumentis, ut omnes contrarietaties
amoveantur. However, this analysis is purely academic - using general
rules of treaty interpretation, semantics, and research. Some space law
academics disagree with this conclusion of the incompatibility of property
rights and the 1967 Space Treaty.
Professor Glen Reynolds believes that a minimal level of property
rights can exist as they do with the res communis character of the oceans. '
He asserts that a state can recognize national jurisdiction over commercial
recovery of mineral resources without violating accepted principles of
international law.1" This jurisdiction does not include any claim of
sovereignty over areas or resources in an area, only extracted resources
and the freedom to explore.' 20  Reynolds proceeds to assert that an
analogous scheme applied to outer space "would not constitute the
extension of sovereignty to outer space" nor does it "even constitute the
creation of full-fledged property rights."-1 Rather, such right would be
termed "an extraction right" - a "mineral right, or right of use."'a
Therefore, the no-sovereignty provision under Reynolds interpretation
115. See id., art. I.
116. "The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and is in the interests of all countries, irrespective of
their degree of economic or scientific development and shall be the province of all mankind." Id.
117. Id.
118. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 234; see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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simply mandates that states "refrain from acts that involve national
appropriation" and that "methods of creating incentives for space
development involving [certain levels of property rights] and even
involving methods in which enterprises do acquire absolute title to land."",2
Despite Professor Reynold's valid assertions, it is very likely other
nations would disagree especially since such an interpretation of the no-
sovereignty provision creating some level of property rights in space would
seem to violate at least three of the general maxims on treaty
interpretation. However, there still may be a chance for such
interpretation to prevail, and this is the exception - omnis intelligitur
rebus sic stantibus.12 The rebus sic stantibus failed in the analysis above
regarding the Treaty as a whole, but would it prevail for only a particular
portion of the Treaty? Probably not.
The reason behind this conclusion is that if there was a violation or
a need to reinterpret the 1967 Space Treaty, the no-sovereignty provision
would probably be the only culprit. It would be difficult to imagine many
violations of the Treaty's other provisions with their humanitarian and
cooperative values that primarily encompass the rest of the treaty.
Furthermore, most nations encourage cooperation'21 and space exploration
for the whole of mankind.1'2 Much of this reasoning is often based on the
need to combine international ingenuity, technology, and financing for
expensive space projects never embarked on before. A simple change of
the Cold War climate might invoke some nations to argue De Vattel's
warning regarding the use of rebus sic stantibus:
[We ought to be very cautious and moderate in the
application of the present rule; it would be a shameful
perversion of it, to take advantage of every change that
happens in the state of affairs, in order to disengage
ourselves from our promises were such conduct adopted,
there could be no dependence place on any promise
whatever.' 27
Therefore, the analysis of the no-sovereignty provision in respect to this
special case of rebus sic stantibus has the same ill fate of the rebus sic
123. Reynolds, supra note 2, at 234; see supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 86-102 (discussing the exception to the general
rules of treaty interpretation).
125. See supra notes 42-43 (treaties and bilateral agreements supporting international
cooperation and freedom of space exploration in their preambles).
126. See, e.g., supra note 28.
127. DE VAT-rEL, supra note 86, at 261.
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stantibus applied to the Treaty as a whole since the no-sovereignty
provision is the only provision likely to be the provision violated.
f Conclusion and General Observations for Vaccine II
There is certainly much room for interpretation of the 1967 Space
Treaty's no-sovereignty provision as allowed by the general maxims of
international law. However, the particular interpretation that includes a
certain level of property rights is not so compatible with certain rules of
treaty interpretations under the fifth general maxim. The one exception to
these general rules, rebus sic stantibus, shows little likelihood for success
either. It fails for the 1967 Space Treaty in general and for the no-
sovereignty provision by itself because it is the only portion of the 1967
Space Treaty that would need reinterpretation or likely to be affected by
the substantial change in the state of things. Furthermore, it is unneeded
because of the withdrawal provision. Thus, this vaccine does not provide
the answer.
3. Vaccine III: United States Denunciation of the 1967 Space
Treaty - International Repercussions
This vaccine, because of the 1967 Space Treaty's withdrawal
clause,'2 is irrelevant in regards to the legality and international perception
of whether it was a proper withdrawal from the 1967 Space Treaty. If no
such provision existed, the United States could only legally withdraw from
the Treaty if other parties had breached the Treaty,'29 or only if such breach
was substantial.' 3 Some authorities believe a violation of a treaty by one
party never terminates the obligations of the other parties no matter how
significant the violations. 3 ' Other authorities believe nations always have
an absolute right to terminate a treaty no matter how significant the
violation. ,32 Today, there appears to be no grounds for the United States to
terminate its obligations under the Treaty under any sort of analysis of
these schools of thought. Absolutely no asserted breaches of the 1967
Space Treaty exist to even fall within the most liberal category of
permissible treaty denunciation. However, contractually under Article
128. See 1967 Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. XVI; see also supra text accompanying
notes 82-85.
129. See BHEK PATI SINHAI, UNILATERAL DENUNCIATION OF TREATY BECAUSE OF PRIOR
VIOLATIONS OF OBLIGATIONS BY OTHER PARTY 1 (1966).
130. Id. at 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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XVI, any signatory can withdraw from the Treaty. As previously
discussed, this is why treaty denunciation is becoming less common. 133
Thus, the United States can legally denunciate the Treaty. That is
not the issue.'1' The issue is the potential impact and negative repercussions
an Article XVI withdrawal would have on the international community. '3
If the United States properly withdrew from the 1967 Space Treaty, it may
not be free to act in violation of the Treaty's principles. The political
consequences of a proper unilateral withdrawal would not be the
withdrawal itself, but fear in the international community over what the
United States might do once it felt it had a right to allocate itself celestial
property. Nations today, including the mighty United States, operate less
in a vacuum than they did years ago. Every state action creates ripples in
the international community at an extremely higher rate than years ago.
Nations do not act or fail to act based on the military repercussions of their
actions. States are intricately tied transnationally via communication,
economics, and government. Note the United Nations' participation in
global conflicts since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the formation of
the European Economic Community. The United States must be very
careful when it takes any act that might have negative international
repercussions, especially with something such as space activities which are
so expensive and require substantial international cooperation.
Additionally, this Treaty and its accompanying principles may
have become ingrained in international law to such a degree that they have
become universally accepted as a rule of positive international law or even
customary international law.1 36 Finally, since most multilateral agreements
have embraced the 1967 Space Treaty in their Preambles, the United States
withdrawing from the 1967 Space Treaty might cause concerns that the
United States might be withdrawing or disaffirming its other agreements
that refer to the treaty.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
134. For some of the issues arising from denunciation where there is no withdrawal
provision, see SINHAI, supra note 129, at 2-3 (e.g., "Are all types of treaties subject to the rule
of unilateral denunciation?"; "Does a party to the treaty have the right or prerogative to act as
the sole judge and interpreter of the occurrence, the nature and consequences of a violation of an
obligation or part of another treaty?;" and, "Does an innocent party have the right to abrogate
the whole of a treaty, or only that part which is affected by violations?").
135. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 233 ("[Tlhe possibility of the United States simply
repudiating the Outer Space Treaty's no-sovereignty provision . . . would probably lead to ugly
international repercussions.") However, Reynolds leaves to speculation exactly what those
repercussions are.
136. See supra text accompanying note 44; Weaver, supra note 108, at 230 (suggesting
some scholars assert that "the principle of freedom of outer space was 'universally accepted as a
rule of positive international has and has never been challenged by any state' [except for
geostationary orbit claims of empty space] by equatorial countries").
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a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine III
Unilateral denunciation from a legal standpoint is not problematic
for the United States provided it uses Article XVI for withdrawal.
However, non legal repercussions may ensue from the international
community. These repercussions would not be in the United States best
interest in not only space commercialization, but in other non related
realms as well. Any nation embarking on space ventures likely requires
international support and cooperation. Further, withdrawal does not
implement a regime to govern property acquisition or questions concerning
liability of intelligent machines, replicating technology, or nanotechnology
utilization in space. The United States might certainly be negatively
affected by another nation's use of such technology. Every state has an
interest in certainty and a structured legal environment in space. Treaty
withdrawal accomplishes none of those things; it only removes barriers to
property right acquisition.
B. Multilateral Action
1. Vaccine IV: Nullification of the 1967 Space Treaty by
Ratification of a Subsequent Treaty11
This vaccine addresses the issue of whether the 1967 Space Treaty
can be simply ignored and another treaty passed that addresses the needed
changes in international space law. Can this be done? Would it be proper
for addressing needed changes in space law? It can be accomplished,
however, the key is getting the same parties who have signed the 1967
Space Treaty to sign the new treaty.'39 If they are the same parties, they
are clearly competent and in the position to address the problems of the
1967 Space Treaty. '"9 They must also make clear their intentions regarding
the prior treaty. Otherwise, the 1967 Space Treaty might remain in
effect.' °  The 1967 Space Treaty has ninety-eight signatories' and if
enough support was garnered to draw up a new treaty creating property
rights, enough support can be garnered to amend the 1967 Space Treaty.
137. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 505.
138. "Where the parties to the two treaties are identical, there can be no doubt that, in
concluding the second treaty, they are competent to abrogate the earlier one. . . ." Id.
139. Id.
140. Certain questions must be answered to determine whether the first treaty remains in
force. "This question is essentially one of the construction of the two treaties in order to
determine the intentions of the parties with respect to the maintenance in force of the earlier
one." Id.
141. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 8.
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If only some of the parties create the new treaty, it will remain
questionable whether the no-sovereignty provision remains in effect.142
a. Conclusion and General Observations of Vaccine IV
Thus far, Vaccine Four appears to be the most valuable in
implementing the needed changes in international space law. A document
can simply be created and passed that embodies the needed changes. This
creates some difficulties such as time constraints and may take some great
motivation to suddenly get the document to pass international scrutiny
before implementation of a high-level space industry or the advent of
nanotechnology. However, it provides the needed results. The main
problem with this vaccine is that the 1967 Space Treaty has permeated
international law at many levels via international agreement preambles and
possible international positive and customary law. Therefore, the 1967
Space Treaty itself will inevitably need to be addressed.
2. Vaccine V: Amendment of the 1967 Space Treaty'4
Vaccine Five does not suffer the same fate of the previous
vaccines. It is the most rational, although it will perhaps take more time
for generating its formulation and international consensus as was the
difficulty in the passage of a subsequent treaty (Vaccine Four). It may
even be more difficult because the no-sovereignty provision will be
addressed directly and the property rights issue will be directly subject to
criticism, especially with the large number of signatories to the Treaty.
However, in the long-run, it could be less time consuming because it could
be implemented much more efficiently than the United States trying to
enforce its vision of space economic theory via internationally destabilizing
means such as withdrawal or non-compliance. Furthermore, time may not
be a crucial factor as perhaps normal treaty amending processes - the
formation of the 1967 Space Treaty was rather immediate. It formed
through a series of resolutions immediately after the launch of Sputnik.
Hence, sudden advances in technology could make the amendment process
much faster. Since amendment is likely needed," an increased or
improved likelihood of the viability of space enterprise could easily
generate resolutions or actual binding international agreements addressing
property right issues and developing a legal regime. It must be conceded
that the principle argument against amendment and the drive toward
142. If the signatories did not intend to terminate or suspend the earlier treaty, the first
treaty has the priority of inconsistent obligations. See id. at 506.
143. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 52, at 456.
144. See supra text and conclusions accompanying notes 60-142.
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finding other means'4 5 for seeking change in international law is that it
gives grave disincentive to space industry now. Industry would be forced
to wait for legal development, or at least lack of legal incentive would slow
space technological development or industrial proliferation. However,
amending the 1967 Space Treaty solves dilemmas unanswerable by any
other vaccine. It would directly address the viral infection of corpus juris
spatialis and lend an opportunity for instilling a legal regime and certainty
into law without simply creating a void by ridding international law of the
Space Treaty's Article II. If such great effort is taken to reinterpret,
withdraw, repudiate, or create an entirely new treaty, that effort needs to
be directed at all the needed changes.
Unprotected property rights in space could cause more havoc for
space investors than no property rights at all. The United States might tell
investors to "go ahead and claim half of the Moon, but beware we will
have to militarily proteqt you because the rest of the world does not
recognize your rights." There could also be a mad rush toward staking
claims in space. Moreover, legal inaction and fast technological
development might cause a mad rush of squatters in space regardless of
international legal prohibitions.'"
Economic development in space will likely require a structured
environment such as the structure and regulation of industry terrestrially.
Amending the 1967 Space Treaty by removing the no-sovereignty clause,
elaborating it or perhaps removing it and creating another treaty, solves
many problems in implementing desired changes in space law. These
qualities make it the best vaccine available. It has its problems in not
creating motivation until amendment is completed and it is slow, but there
may be methods to improve the efficacy of this vaccine and ridding it of its
drawbacks. That key is United States domestic policy.
3. Improving the Efficacy of Vaccine Six - A Vigorous United
States Domestic Policy'14
Unlike Congress and state legislatures, the United Nations does not
have an analogous lobbying structure to implement legislative change.
People are not salaried solely for the purpose of wining and dining United
Nations ambassadors to have their views affect United Nations decision
making. United Nations lobbyists are the states themselves (although they
may be acting on behalf of internal or domestic lobbying interests). The
145. Referring to the four previous vaccines beginning with the simplest to accomplish.
146. See McKendree, supra note 52.
147. See Twibell, supra note 1, at 53, n.376 (stating that strong national policy may be the
key for changing space law and that some commentators outside the legal field firmly advocate
this course of action).
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United States could be a lobbyist for the space and property right cause by
promoting its own space industry and preparing to do so. Such maneuvers
of the world's largest economic and technological giant would not go
unnoticed, rather, it would send a message of an impending need for a new
international space regime. Other nations would observe the United States
preparing for massive space ventures that could question the 1967 Space
Treaty's no-sovereignty provision. They would then be extremely
motivated to act upon their concerns and address property right issues
before the United States foreseeably quashes their opportunities -
perceptively to them anyway. Further, other nations would necessarily and
inevitably work in conjunction with the United States in its space
endeavors, paving the path further or international legal change.
VI. CONCLUSION - CIRCUMNAVIGATING INTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW
When the early space explorers dreamed of traveling from one side
of the globe to the other, they envisioned vast riches and short navigable
routes to reach those riches. Christopher Columbus sought a shortcut to
India, only to have found the longest route to what was really India.
Magellan took a route through the Straits of Magellan and the Pacific
Ocean only to find the Pacific Ocean was eighty percent larger than he
thought, resulting in Magellan practically circumnavigating the globe.141
Captain Cook's voyages took him around the world and he took no
shortcuts. 14 9 He was a great navigator and knew the oceans well. His
voyages were very profitable.1'1 In this paper, shortcuts were sought as
well in finding the best direct route to needed legal change in international
space law. Similarly to the early explorers, the best route was the direct
route often requiring a long path, or rather, circumnavigation of the world.
Some of the shortcuts, as the shortcuts sought by the ancient ocean
explorers, may really be the longest route to the desired destination.
Amendment of the 1967 Space Treaty may take us the long way around the
world, but it is the most direct route. Albeit the route is long and hard, it
is the best route for instituting needed legal change in the international
corpus juris spatialis. Further, it will be strong United States policy that
persuades Queen Isabella to fund and make the long voyage a reality - a
voyage that will not only bring economic and humanitarian prosperity to
Portugal or Europe, but to all the world.
148. BOORSTIN, supra note 16, at 264.
149. See id. at 278-89.
150. See id.
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